Abstract. Cipher-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a more efficient and flexible encryption system as the encryptor can control the access structure when encrypting a message. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving decentralized CP-ABE (PPDCP-ABE) scheme where the central authority is not required, namely each authority can work independently without the cooperation to initialize the system. Meanwhile, a user can obtain secret keys from multiple authorities without releasing his global identifier (GID) and attributes to them. This is contrasted to the previous privacy-preserving multi-authority ABE (PPMA-ABE) schemes where a user can obtain secret keys from multiple authorities with them knowing his attributes and a central authority is required. However, some sensitive attributes can also release the user's identity information. Hence, contemporary PPMA-ABE schemes cannot fully protect users' privacy as multiple authorities can cooperate to identifier a user by collecting and analyzing his attributes. Therefore, it remains a challenging and important work to construct a PPMA-ABE scheme where the central authority is not required and both the identifiers and the attributes are considered.
Introduction
In network society, users can be identified by their distinct attributes. For example, European electronic identity cards often contain the attributes: nationality, sex, civil status, hair and eye color, and applicable minority status. These attributes are either binary or discrete numbers from a pre-defined finite sets [1] . Especially, they are very privacy-sensitive and require a selective disclosure of one while hiding others completely; otherwise, a user can be identified and impersonated by collecting and analyzing his attributes.
In practical applications, we often share data with some expressive attributes without knowing who will receive it. To resolve this problem, Sahai and Waters
[2] introduced the seminal concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE). In this new encryption system, there is a central authority who monitors the universal attributes and distributes secrete keys to users accordingly. A user can decrypt a ciphertext if and only if there is a match between the attributes which he holds and the attributes listed in the ciphertext. Since it can protect the confidentiality of sensitive data and express flexible access control, ABE schemes have been focused extensively [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
To reduce the trust on the central authority, Chase [9] proposed a multiauthority ABE (MA-ABE) scheme where multiple authorities must cooperate with the central authority to initialize the system. Then, Lewko and Waters [10] proposed a new MA-ABE scheme called decentralized CP-ABE (DCP-ABE) where multiple authorities can work independently without a central authority or any cooperation among them.
Privacy in Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption
In an MA-ABE scheme, malicious users may combine their secret keys to create a new secret key if the multiple authorities work independently [9] . For example, suppose that there is a ciphertext which can be decrypted by the attributes monitored by the authorities A 1 and A 2 . If Alice obtains secret keys from A 1 and Bob obtains secret keys from A 2 , they can collaborate to decrypt the ciphertext. To overcome this hurdle, each user in the system [9] must be designated an unique global identifier (GID) which is known by each authority. When generating secret keys for the user, the authorities tie them to his GID.
Privacy issues in MA-ABE are the primary concern of users as the authorities can personate the target user if they know his attributes. Some schemes towards solving this problem have been proposed, but they cannot provide a complete solution, because, in all these schemes, only the privacy of the GID has been considered. Currently, there is no any scheme addressing the privacy issue of the attributes in MA-ABE schemes. However, it is extremely important as a user can be identified by some sensitive attributes. For example, suppose that the Head of the Department of Computer Science is Bob. Given two sets of attributes S 1 ={Position="Header", Department="CS", Sex="Male"} and S 2 = {Position="PhD Student", Department="CS", Sex="Male"}, we can guess S 1 is the attributes of Bob even if we do not know his GID. This clearly shows that controlled release of sensitive attributes is necessary.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving decentralized CP-ABE (PPDCP-ABE) scheme. In our scheme, any authority can dynamically join or leave the system, and there is no any requirement for the central authority or interactions among multiple authorities. As a notable feature, each authority can work independently, while other authorities do not need to change their secret keys and reinitialize the system when an authority joins or leaves the system. Each
